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“From the genes, and perhaps from early childhood development
as well, we obtain our basic sexual drive and preferences. But how
we translate these into actual behavior depends on social factors—
including opportunities, resources, and constraints. Sex is a means to
human ends, and the efficient fitting of means to ends, whether done
consciously or unconsciously, is the economist’s notion of
rationality.”1
—Judge Richard A. Posner
“There exists in the mind a strong tendency towards the pleasure
principle, but that tendency is opposed by certain other forces or
circumstances, so that the final outcome cannot always be in
harmony with the tendency toward pleasure.”2
—Sigmund Freud
“Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited,
certain activities not because they harm others but because they are
considered, in the traditional phrase, ‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e.,
immoral.”3
—Justice Antonin Scalia
“What is pornography to one man is the laughter of genius to another.”4
—D.H. Lawrence

1. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 436 (1992) [hereinafter POSNER, SEX AND
REASON].
2. TEODROS KIROS, SELF-CONSTRUCTION AND THE FORMATION OF HUMAN VALUES 105
(1998) (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 4 (James Strachey ed.,
trans., 2d ed. 1961)).
3. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
4. D. H. LAWRENCE, PORNOGRAPHY AND SO ON 11 (1936).
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
It is through zoning that rationality in land-use development is achieved and
means are fitted to ends. Indeed, the very justification for zoning has been to
“separate incompatible uses of property.”5 In land-use regulation, a normative
analysis of conduct—and, for purposes of this Article, sexual expression—is
evaluated “by [its] practical consequences rather than by [its] conformity to
moral, political, or religious ideas.”6 It is not possible to divorce a zoning plan
altogether from these forces, however; nor can the Common Law be expected
to be unreceptive to these forces in determining whether an action is, under the
law of nuisance, an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
property and thus subject to abatement.7
Ideally, then, an argument may be made that land-use regulations should
show “rational adaptations to . . . social circumstances,”8 and, by doing so,
these adaptations may be sustained as reasonable exercises of constitutional
power.9 Consequently, to sustain zoning law that infringes upon a zone of
protected liberties that are guaranteed by the Constitution as such, it must not
only be drawn narrowly, but also must seek to further a governmental interest
that is recognized as substantial.10 In crafting a zoning restriction, care must be
taken to narrow the application of a restriction, simply because the more
general the focus of a law, “the clumsier a tool for abuse” it becomes.11

5. Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1222, 1225 (2009); see also DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND
USE 49 (5th ed. 2008) (providing a sample list of zoning districts that separate land into different
zones based upon the permitted use of the land); JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS
E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 23 (1998) (“The purposes of zoning
were to segregate residential uses from more intensive uses of land such as industrial, and thereby
to provide safer, more quiet areas for family life.”).
6. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1, at 437.
7. See George P. Smith II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist
Theory of Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEV. L. REV. 658, 670 (1995) (discussing the cost-benefit
analysis involved in determining the proper use of a reasonableness inquiry) [hereinafter Smith,
Nuisance Law]; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) (defining public
nuisance). But see Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L.
REV. 485, 524–25 (2010) (asserting that common law jurisdictions that do not follow the
Restatement of Torts standards for determining nuisance actions are at fault for balancing
“competing interests as they see fit, considering only ‘the needs of justice’ broadly defined”; there
are, quite simply, neither definitive rules nor normative principles to guide courts in determining
what interests are appropriate to consider when balancing occurs).
8. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1, at 437.
9. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (stating that, when land-use regulations do not
adapt to social circumstances, those regulations may prove unconstitutional).
10. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 63 (1981).
11. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 734 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
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The Common Law has always been seen as a system shaped by morality,12
which, in turn, is viewed as a “body of imperfect generalizations expressed in
terms of emotion.”13 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. has cautioned that, in order
to seek truth in the law, it is better to omit emotion and, instead, “ask ourselves
what those generalizations are and how far they are confirmed by fact
accurately ascertained.”14
No doubt, one of the fundamental (and imperfect) generalizations of the
common law is that an unreasonable use of real property may be abated under
the law of nuisance.15 Yet, the extent to which an action by one party causes
an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of property and is,
thus, subject to restraint in equity through injunctive relief is exceedingly
problematic.16 Endeavoring to determine what is unreasonable conduct is
nothing short of navigating an “impenetrable jungle.”17
Although over time the foundational meanings of nuisance have been shown
to be quite durable,18 confusion, uncertainty, and inefficiency resulting from its
application19 are tied inextricably to the inherently subjective nature of
ascertaining when conduct is so “unreasonable” as to be injurious.20 Because
of these limitations, the law of nuisance has been said to be impracticable for
application and use as a contemporary land-use control-device.21
The constitutional underpinnings of the limitations on a state or local
government’s ability to zone sexually oriented businesses (SOBs) lie in the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.22 Early American jurisprudence focused
primarily on protecting religious communities in determining what material
12. See Ronald J. Allen, Moral Choices, Moral Truth, and the Eighth Amendment, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 28 (2008) (indicating that morality will often be considered in
judicial decision-making regardless of the issue before the court); Ronald Reagan, President of
the U.S., Politics and Morality Are Inseparable (Aug. 23, 1984), in 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 7, 7 (1984) (acknowledging religion as the “bedrock of moral order”).
13. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV 1 (1915), reprinted in
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 117, 119 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
14. Id.
15. See Smith, Nuisance Law, supra note 7, at 701–02 (illustrating the balancing inquiry
courts conduct between the benefit of abatement and the cost to the defendant of abating the
nuisance in order to achieve efficient use of resources).
16. Id. at 663–64.
17. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971).
18. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 356 (1999).
19. Robert Elickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 720 (1973).
20. Smith, Nuisance Law, supra note 7, at 701–02.
21. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 5, at 10–11 (questioning how well nuisance law serves as a
land-control device when it must consider both the social value of the land and economic factors).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
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could lawfully be regulated.23 In analyzing this content, the courts applied an
evolving standard for what constituted obscenity and, therefore, non-protected
speech.24 These early attempts at limiting obscenity focused on protection of
churches and their messages and on protection from the harm that could result
from anyone, young or old, coming into contact with obscene material.25
In the 1950s, as the Supreme Court of the United States distanced itself from
a protectionist test and adopted a community-based standard for defining
obscenity;26 communities still sought to protect the public from unfettered
access to pornography.27 Because pornography could no longer be assumed to
fall into the obscene category28—and was therefore transformed into possibly
protected speech29—municipalities enacted zoning laws that attempted to
control the concentration of sexually oriented businesses in their jurisdictions
for the protection of the public.30 The Court has endorsed these ordinances
provided they are supported by factual findings to satisfy the “secondary
effects” test, essentially protecting the community from other social ills by
limiting access to SOBs.31 These ordinances are not restricting the distribution
of non-obscene speech, but rather the location from which it may be done.32
The tension between an obscenity standard that allows a community to
decide what it finds acceptable and a zoning standard that allows a local
government to restrict the location of non-obscene sexually oriented businesses
must be resolved in favor of the zoning ordinances that prevent other social
harms beyond the sexual content. In other words, if communities can justify
regulating the location of sexually oriented businesses based on factors such as
crime or drug use, and not the sexual nature of the material distributed, those
regulations must be upheld and enforced.

23. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part III.A–B.
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 251–52 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting different means through which communities have attempted to address
sexually oriented businesses).
28. See infra Part III.B.
29. See infra Part III.B; see also David D. Cole, Playing by Pornography Rules: The
Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1994) (“Even where speech is not
legally obscene, the Court permits the government to regulate ‘offensive’ sexual speech in ways
that it could not regulate ‘offensive’ political speech.”).
30. See infra Part IV.C.
31. See infra Part IV.C.
32. See infra note 260 and accompanying text; see also Carol A. Crocca, Annotation,
Validity of Ordinances Restricting Location of “Adult Entertainment” or Sex-Oriented
Businesses, 10 A.L.R. 5TH 538, 555 (1993) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence validating
“zoning ordinances restricting the location of adult businesses” and “making it clear that adult
entertainment businesses are subject to a municipality’s zoning power like other
businesses . . . .”).
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One purpose of this Article is to rebut the arguments that attempt to
marginalize the utility of the law of nuisance in land-use control—and
specifically its practical use in the regulation of sexually oriented businesses
(SOBs). This Article will proceed to demonstrate that the common law of
nuisance, guided modernly by the Restatement (Second) of Torts33 and given
new, broad, interpretative power through the use of the concept of “moral
nuisance,”34 remains a strong tool, together with exclusionary zoning and
business-licensing requirements, to contain the placement of SOBs and their
operations.
Part I investigates the nature of moral reasoning in judicial decision-making
focusing on the extent to which moral values are intrinsic to legal reasoning.
The Article undertakes a brief historical survey of the vectors of force in
colonial America, which were crucial to the subsequent adoption of a valueladen (normative) construct for shaping moral conduct.35 The extent to which
state action is proper to set and enforce moral codes is explored through the
works of John Stuart Mill36 and the twentieth-century debates of Patrick Devlin
and H.L.A. Hart on the extent of liberty.37 These debates serve as a useful
framework from which to consider how the American legal system continues
to grapple with the very same issues of liberty and of responsibility enunciated
by Mill in 1859.38 This analysis serves as a bridge to investigate the
“immoral” and insidious nature of the promotion and distribution of obscenity
and pornography through the practices of SOBs as well as in the new markets
of cyberspace, which have made pornography a significant part of American
culture.39
Part II examines the common law doctrine of nuisance and probes the extent
to which it continues as a useful construct for land-use development.
In Part III of this Article, the evolution of the regulation of obscenity will be
traced from its religious-based enactments in early-American history to the
community-centered determinations that now govern what is defined as
obscene. Additionally, this section explores the underlying constitutional
issues that control the modern test for obscenity.

33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827–28 (1979) (listing factors to consider
when determining the gravity of the harm caused by the nuisance and the utility of conduct that
caused the nuisance).
34. See generally John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 267 (2001)
(discussing a number of instances where the concept of moral nuisances has been used to combat
situations normally abated as public nuisances). Actions for anticipatory and aesthetic nuisance
may also be control options to regulate SOBs. See infra notes 172, 175.
35. See infra Part 1.A.
36. See infra Part 1.B.
37. See infra Part 1.C.
38. See infra Part 1.C.
39. See infra Part 1.D.
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Part IV addresses the use of zoning regulations to control both the influx and
the continued operation of non-obscene sexually oriented businesses in
communities. This Part also analyzes the combination of community-based
obscenity standards and secondary-effects zoning standards. This combination
provides a potentially workable, but an uneven and geographically diverse
standard for the operation of a sexually oriented business.
This Article concludes by finding that, in reviewing zoning ordinances,
courts will rarely hold that an SOB restriction is based on a motive to control
the content of adult entertainment; rather, they will hold that these restrictions
are content-neutral in order to give deference to local governments to establish
zoning schemes in accordance with their police powers.
I. MORAL REASONING AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS
Determining a firm and fair basis for moral judgments cannot be derived
Even though this theory may be
exclusively from moral theory.40
used—although limitedly—to serve as a foundation for some moral judgments,
it simply “should not be used as a basis for legal judgments.”41 Any form of
“moral subjectivism” must be eschewed in favor of “moral relevatism,” which
acknowledges that there is no single criterion for testing whether a moral claim
is valid.42 Rather, any determination made of the morality or immorality of
conduct is situational and only relative to an individual’s personal standards of
morality.43 The exigencies of life within each culture or community are
determinative of the moral code that is structured within it,44 thus making
morality truly a local issue and one that varies from community to
community.45 Seeking to legislate a uniform moral code is therefore
problematic.46

40. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1637, 1639 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Problematics]. Posner subsequently developed these
lectures into a book under the same title. See RICHARD. A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (2002).
41. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1639; see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
268 (2d ed. 1994) (maintaining that there is no necessary or logical connection between the
content of law and morality).
42. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1642–43.
43. Id. at 1643.
44. Id. at 1650; see also H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 7–8 (1962)
(discussing the differing views on laws against “injur[ing] public morals” in the United States and
England) [hereinafter HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY].
45. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1650.
46. George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533,
534 (1987) (discussing the view that “we cannot legislate morality”). Fletcher notes that,
“[w]hile the prevailing view today treats law and morality as intersecting sets of rules and rights,
the Kantian view treats the two as distinct and nonintersecting.” Id. Equally as perplexing is
determining the kind of benefit accruing, and to whom, when laws “track morality.” Ray
Jackendoff, The Natural Logic of Morals and of Laws, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 405 (2009).
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If morality is determined by the local environment,47 how broad does the
concept of locality reach? If the Tenth Amendment extends to states the right
to regulate public health, safety, and morals of the individual state,48 then the
legislature of each state has broad powers, virtually free from federal
interference, to act as the moral authority for its citizens. In theory, if a citizen
disagrees with a state’s interpretation of his moral code, that citizen may leave
that state and join citizens with similar moral beliefs, or, better yet, gather
other citizens to effectuate change by convincing them that the state’s morals
are incorrect and must be changed through the voting process. In essence, this
ability to regulate morals should also be extended to counties and local
municipalities in order to maximize a person’s “moral liberty.”49 This view
comports with Jean Jacques Rousseau’s ideal of the social contract under
which citizens relinquish their own natural liberty in order to subject
themselves to civil liberty, which, in turn, is limited by the general will.50
Although moral reasoning and legal reasoning are acknowledged as subsets
of normative reasoning,51 “legal questions can and should be answered without
first being translated into moral questions, and without the aid of moral
theory.”52 Granted, law surely supports a number of moral principles; yet,
morality is not backed up by law.53 Indeed, in general, morality is not enforced
by law.54 When moral issues are in conflict and are presented to the courts for
legal resolution, a sophisticated judiciary should defer such matters to the
legislative or political process for resolution.55

47. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1650 (“Every society, and every subculture
within a society, past or present, has had a moral code, but a code shaped by the exigencies of life
in that society or that subculture . . . .”).
48. See Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”:
Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 46 (2006)
(discussing the power of local governments to regulate based on “that extremely broad power of
government to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people that is reserved
to the states in the federal Constitution”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
49. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 19 (1947) (“[W]e might add to
the other acquisitions of the civil state that of moral liberty . . . .”).
50. Id.
51. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1649.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1694.
54. Id. at 1695; see also Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 710, 711 (1995) (arguing that, although “law and social morality will constrain
much of the same behavior[,] . . . this does not mean . . . that the law will enforce every aspect of
morality that concerns preventing harm to others”).
55. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1708.
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A. Shaping Moral Values in Early America
Whether society has the right to use the law to enforce its moral judgments
is a question of great historical moment and one of ongoing debate.56 Indeed,
from the very formation of American society, colonial legislation sought to
regulate morality,57 finding its basis for action in “a mixture of biblical and
common law sources”58 together with the moral law manifested therefrom.59
Alexis de Tocqueville observed in Democracy in America I that early
legislators were concerned with more than just social order; they were also
concerned with society’s morals.60 He stated, “The chief care of the legislators
in this body of penal laws was the maintenance of orderly conduct and good
morals in the community; thus they constantly invaded the domain of
conscience, and there was scarcely a sin which was not subject to magisterial
censure.”61 Although de Tocqueville is personally critical of this legislation as
being “discreditable to human reason,”62 he nonetheless recognized that early
American legislation “admirably combined the spirit of religion and the spirit
of liberty.”63 Thus, in early America, “the legal regulation of morality was
striking . . . partly because of the extensive reliance on Scripture and partly
because English law itself had religious sources.”64 Notably, the founders
believed that man had a “fallen human nature,”65 and that there was a
coordinate need to be guided by “republican virtue” if survival of the new
American form of governance was to be assured.66
Even though the harshness of early colonial penal law was mitigated by the
time the United States was founded, “the laws of different states still prohibited
a variety of moral offenses . . . includ[ing], for example, bigamy, adultery,
fornication, sodomy, bestiality, gambling, drunkenness, Sabbath violations,
blasphemy, and profanity.”67 Acts such as lewdness and public indecency
were also recognized with limitations because states believed that such acts

56. PATRICK A. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 131 (1965).
57. Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS.
65, 69 (2000) (“In early America, the legitimacy of morals legislation was widely accepted.”).
58. Id. at 70.
59. Id. at 69–70.
60. 1 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 38 (Vintage Books 1990) (1945).
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Wolfe, supra note 57, at 69 (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 60, at 39).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 71 (citing GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY
MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN TRADITION AND DESIGN 143–45 (1960)).
65. William A. Stanmeyer, Keeping the Constitutional Republic: Civic Virtue vs.
Pornographic Attack, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 566 (1987) (internal quotation omitted)
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison)).
66. Id. at 566 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 14, 18 (James Madison)).
67. Wolfe, supra note 57, at 71.
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threatened the core of virtuous society.68 Notably, “[t]hese laws, for the most
part, remained on the books, at least in some jurisdictions, for most of
American history.”69
B. John Stuart Mill’s Legacy
Although many issues related to law and morality have been debated over
the course of American history, “[t]he power [of the government] to regulate
morality remained a firmly established part of American law until well into the
twentieth century.”70 The modern debate on whether it is legitimate for a
government to enforce morality as an end in itself was a revival of the debate
that John Stuart Mill began in his 1859 essay, “On Liberty.”71
In this essay, Mill set forth the principle that the government’s right to
regulate morality is restricted to those individual behaviors that cause harm to
others.72 Mill believed that the government should not have the power to
punish individuals simply because others believe their behavior is immoral.73
Specifically, he stated
[t]hat the only purpose for which power can rightfully be
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled
to do or forebear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because in the opinion of others, to do so
would be wise or even right.74
Mill also advocated for a broader principle of liberalism, one of harmless
action, or as he put it, “liberty of tastes and pursuits . . . of doing as we like,
subject to such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our
fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they
should think our conduct foolish, perverse or wrong.”75 He believed that it was
inconsistent with the principles of individual liberty to use the government to
coerce the individual because “‘a person’s taste is as much his own peculiar

68. Stanmeyer, supra note 65, at 573–74.
69. Wolfe, supra note 57, at 71.
70. Id.
71. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1999)
(1859); Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the Limits of State Police Power, 12
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 12 (1999).
72. MILL, supra note 71, at 13.
73. Id.; see also Ku, supra note 71, at 13.
74. MILL, supra note 71, at 13 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 16; see also THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 3
(1983) (quoting MILL, supra note 71, at 16) (noting Mill’s discussion of “a general liberty of
action”).
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concern as his opinion or purse[,]’ and over one’s body and mind, the
individual is the absolute sovereign.”76
C. Philosophical Interpretations and Judicial Constructs for Decision-Making
On-going debate over Mill’s principle of liberalism has continued through
the years and was revised notably in the twentieth century by two Englishmen,
Patrick Devlin and H.L.A. Hart.77 In 1958, British judge Sir Patrick
Devlin—in response to calls for the statute regulating homosexuality and
prostitution to be repealed—argued that “no separate sphere of merely private
morality could be marked off as in principle outside the concern of the criminal
law . . . [because] the health of a society rested on its firm adherence to a
binding moral code,” which he thought must be subject to legal enforcement.78
Soon after Devlin announced his position, British legal philosopher H.L.A.
Hart, in his book, Law, Liberty, and Morality,79 entered the dispute arguing for
a modern revision of Mill’s principle.80
Those subscribing to the Millian principles—which H.L.A. Hart
favored—advocate for acceptance of a nation of liberty in action even though
the parameters of this ideal remain imprecise and, indeed, even contentious
among its supporters.81 In essence, these Millians argue for adoption of a
general, rather open-ended, principle which acknowledges that individuals
should be free to act autonomously so long as their actions are not injurious to
others.82 Even though nuanced in its application by varying factual situations,
this position is anchored to the proposition that if an individual is legally
competent, he is in the best position to assess and determine the morality of his
own personal conduct.83 Hart was especially fearful of majoritarian power to

76. Ku, supra note 71, at 13 (alteration in original) (quoting MILL, supra note 71, at 103);
see Todd E. Pettys, Sodom’s Shadow: The Uncertain Line Between Public and Private Morality,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1199 (2010) (discussing the difficulties in determining standards for
distinguishing between public and private morality). In contemporary society, “[l]iberalism is
often associated with a rejection of corporate authority in favor of individual autonomy and with a
belief that important questions can be resolved by rational inquiry.” KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 21 (1988).
77. GREY, supra note 75, at 4–5.
78. Id. at 4. “[H]istory shows that the loosening of moral bounds is often the first stage of
disintegration, so that society is justified in taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as it
does to preserve its government and other essential institutions.” DEVLIN, supra note 56, at 13.
79. A second book, or sequel to this book, was The Morality of the Criminal Law in which
Hart maintains that conduct viewed as immoral by some is not a sufficient reason to criminalize
conduct seen as homosexual. See H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1965).
80. GREY, supra note 75, at 5; see HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY, supra note 44.
81. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY, supra note 44, at 11.
82. See supra text accompanying note 74.
83. Ku, supra note 71, at 13.
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impose upon the minority, through the law, its uncontested view of
morality—particularly when questioned actions were not harmful to others.84
Arguing to the contrary, supporters of the Devlin philosophy maintain that
when deciding whether the government has a right to regulate morality, an ad
hoc analysis must be undertaken which, of necessity, includes a consideration
of all circumstances rather than one a priori principle.85 Thus, instead of
advocating a general principle for governing the law’s right to regulate
morality, the Devlinites argue simply that each piece of “morals legislation is
an open-ended matter of policy to be decided by weighing all factors that might
For Devlin, himself, popular
seem relevant in the circumstances.”86
morality—as shaped by the responses of a reasonable man, although accepted
as commonly held views—was not necessarily derived from objective reason,
but could be drawn from subjective values and beliefs.87 Under this view,
then, if society believed a certain conduct to be “so abominable that its mere
presence [was] an offence,” this would be a proper basis for legal prohibitions
to be set in law.88
Although this debate over the continuing power of the government to
regulate morality was raised initially within the context of democratic theory
and moral philosophy, it soon touched the formation of law in the United
States.89 Starting dramatically with the Warren Court, the fundamental right of
the law to regulate morality began to be challenged constitutionally on the
grounds of a newly created right to privacy.90
Generally, judges during the twentieth century had—when considering
issues of morality—either followed a judicial philosophy that precedent directs
decision-making or, when confronting constitutional issues, that interpretations
be guided by and reflect the moral conditions of society.91 Judges embracing
84. See HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY, supra note 44, at 77–78 (“[T]he greatest of
the dangers . . . was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but
that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they
should do so.”). Note also that the question of what constitutes “harm” has been the subject of
rigorous debate. GREY, supra note 75, at 13–14.
85. GREY, supra note 75, at 11.
86. Id.
87. DEVLIN, supra note 56, at 9, 15.
88. Id. at 17. For example, in arguing for criminalizing homosexual sodomy, Devlin
asserted that disgust cannot be ignored “if it is deeply felt and not manufactured. Its presence is a
good indication that the bounds of toleration are being reached.” Id.
89. GREY, supra note 75, at 6.
90. Id. at 7; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1966) (holding that a “right to
privacy” existed and was protected “by several fundamental constitutional guarantees”).
91. See Evelyn Keyes, Two Conceptions of Judicial Integrity: Traditional and Perfectionist
Approaches to Issues of Morality and Social Justice, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
233, 237–38 (2008).
[T]raditional judges faced with resolving cases that present controversial moral issues
would argue that their task as judges is to preserve the morality built into the law while
refusing to enforce laws or promulgate rules of law that do not conform to that
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the second philosophy often injected their personal standards of morality into
opinions,92 which, in turn, determined a number of socially charged issues that,
rightly or wrongly, have effected monumental social change in America.93 The
extent to which the judicial temperament of the present century is either
following that of the twentieth century or establishing new parameters for
analysis and interpretation has yet to be established.94
D. Profiteering in Pornography
It may be surprising to those that founded, in their perspective, a moral
society that pornography is a thriving business in present-day America. The
pornography industry’s stock in trade is, quite simply, “fantasy,” which,
depending upon the social and the political climate, can change dramatically.95
The primary challenge that the industry must meet “is to identify and respond
to often bewildering shifts in standards of sexual attractiveness.”96
Although exact figures regarding the economic investment in the
pornography industry in America are unknown,97 informed judgments

embedded morality, while judges who read the constitution morally would deny that
the positive law is intrinsically moral and capable of resolving moral issues.
Id.
92. Id. at 286–87.
93. Id. at 237–38, 282–83; see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2–3, 11–12 (1967)
(exhibiting judicial perspectives on race relations in a case concerning a ban on interracial
marriage); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954) (discussing race in the context
of school segregation); see also Genna Rae McNeil, Before Brown: Reflections on Historical
Context and Vision, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1455–56 (2003) (discussing how the Brown
decision focused on individual rights and not the suffering of African Americans as a group).
94. See Justin Ewers, Ranking the Politics of Supreme Court Justices, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (May 12, 2008), http://politics.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/05/12/rankingthe-politics-of-supreme-court-justices.html (noting that it is difficult, in some instances, to
compare the current Supreme Court with the Court in previous decardes). But see George P.
Smith II, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 93, 93 (2008) (“[T]he social constructs and legal tools necessary for the modern
judiciary to meet head-on and deal with the contentious issues of bioethics and biotechnology are
already in place.”).
95. FREDERICK S. LANE III, OBSCENE PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF PORNOGRAPHY IN
THE CYBER AGE 97 (2000).
96. Id. Pornography allows men to play out sexual fantasies, which, in turn, bolsters an
inflated sense of masculinity. See GAIL DINES, PORNLAND: HOW PORN HIJACKED OUR
SEXUALITY xxvii (2010) (discussing pornographic scenes “as a vehicle to mark the feminine as
all-powerless and the masculine as all-powerful”). Additionally, one pornography actor, who is
also a producer, expressed his belief that men expect the portrayal of violence against women in
pornography. Id. at xxvi, xxvii, 135.
97. This lack of exact figures is simply because the industry itself is seen as operating “as an
underground market.” Joe Knowles, X Factor: America Loves Its Smut, but Censors Say
Enough’s Enough, REDEYE, May 14, 2004, at 8.
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“estimate that porn generates at least $4 billion and perhaps as much as $12
billion in annual revenues in the U.S. alone.”98
1. Regulating Immoral Conduct
Statistics show that, since 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice has brought
less than ten prosecutions for obscenity.99 This underscores the Department’s
aversion to assuming aggressive leadership in this arena.100 Rather than
prosecuting adult pornography—which is not illegal in itself, but can be
prosecuted as obscenity under the Miller v. California precedent101—the policy
of the Department has been directed toward combating child pornography and
human trafficking.102
2. Second-Hand Smut
Internet obscenity presents a particular challenge to enforcement efforts
simply because “law enforcement seems not to have the time, resources or
inclination to pursue it.”103 Since the Federal Communications Decency Act
was held unconstitutional in 1997, federal support of actions to limit Internet
speech has shifted to legislative efforts at the state and local levels and to
98. Id. This statistic positions the pornography industry as a bigger income-producing
source in the American economy than the National Football League (estimated at $5 billion
annually) and the National Basketball Association (estimated at $3 billion). Id. In 2006, the
estimated value of the entire porn industry was set “around $96 billion,” with the U.S. market
worth approximately $13 billion. DINES, supra note 96, at 47. Another source estimates that $10
billion per year is generated from adult entertainment. Rebecca Leung, Porn in the U.S.A.: Steve
Kroft Reports on a $10 Billion Industry, CBS News (Sept. 5 2004),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/21/60minutes/main585049.shtml.
99. Jason Krause, The End of the Net Porn, 94 ABA J. 52, at 55 (Feb. 2008).
100. Id. at 55–56.
101. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Pursuant to this decision, if pornographic material “taken as a
whole, appeal[s] to the prurient interest in sex, which portray[s] sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do[es] not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value,” it is declared to be obscene. Id.
102. See Jerry Seper, 27 Charged in Child-Porn Sting: Images Traded Worldwide on Internet
Chat Room, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at A3 (discussing the Justice Department’s
involvement in prosecuting persons caught “using a private Internet ‘chat room’ worldwide to
trade thousands of images of child pornography”); see also Jesse P. Basbaum, Inequitable
Sentencing for Possession of Child Pornography: A Failure to Distinguish Voyeurs from
Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1281, 1302 (2010) (discussing criticism of and statistics concerning
sentencing guidelines for the crime of possessing child pornography); Clay Calvert & Justin
Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 469, 470 (2000) (noting that Internet pornography and its
accompanying “sexually explicit speech raises serious questions about invasion of privacy and
leaves in its wake real adult victims, not simply minors”); A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes
on Child Pornography Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, at A1 (discussing Judge Jack B.
Weinstein’s view that those who view images of child pornography do not “present a threat to
children,” in contrast to those who produce or sell photos).
103. Krause, supra note 99, at 56.
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reliance on community standards of morality.104 Policing Internet use of
pornography for approximately 28,258 users per second is simply an
impossible situation.105
Today, there is little or no need to pay for pornography at an SOB because it
is free on the Internet;106 sites that allow watching or streaming pornography
on the Internet are common place.107 The prevalence of wireless Internet
access and the promise of downloadable high-definition movies that will
permit pornography to be viewed on portable devices108 are creating a new
type of lewdness or public nuisance: “second-hand smut.”109 At issue here is
the appropriateness of viewing Internet pornography in public venues, such as
buses, airplanes, gyms, libraries, and at sporting events when these displays
may force a bystander to view pornographic images.110 With the growing use
of portable laptop computers and hand-held electronics, more and more
passive, non-accepting occupants of seats adjacent to Internet users are finding
themselves unwilling captives of this “second-hand smut.”111 In order to limit
this conduct in air travel, some airlines announced in 2008 that they are
devising ways to filter inappropriate Internet usage.112

104. LANE, supra note 95, at 284–88.
105. Family Safe Media, Pornography Statistics, http://www.familysafemedia.com/
pornography_statistics.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). With Internet porn pages numbering 420
million and porn web sites 4.2 million, it is not surprising that, on a daily basis, there are 68
million search engine requests for pornography. DINES, supra note 96, at 47; see also, The
Average Guy and His Income, MEN’S HEALTH, http://www.menshealth.com/mens
wealth/average_guy_income.html (William G. Phillips ed.) (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) (noting that
porn clips were among three items the “average guy” wishes automatic teller machines would
dispense).
Another study determined that seventy percent of men in the eighteen to thirty-four age
bracket view Internet porn at least once a month. Erik Unger, Skin Trade Filling Corporate
Cofers, REDEYE, May 14, 2004, at 8. The average age for boys viewing porn is eleven years,
with the corresponding argument that porn is thus “encoded into a boy’s sexual identity” and
thereby prevents sexual development “out of life experiences” and, indeed becomes part of a
child’s socialization. DINES, supra note 96, at xi, 170.
106. Marcus Baram, Free Porn Threatens Adult Film Industry, ABC News (June 11, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/business/story?id=3259416&page=1.
107. Monica Hesse, Publicly a Whole New Lewdness: Everywhere You Look, Porn Is
Suddenly Inescapable, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2009, at C1.
108. Mike Musgrove, Mini-Porn Could Be Mega-Business: Video iPods, Cell Phones
Provide New Vehicles for Adult Industry, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at D1.
109. Hesse, supra note 107.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. But see Donna Goodison, Virgin Flights to Allow ‘Adult’ Sites, BOS. HERALD, Feb.
11, 2009, at 30 (reporting that passengers on Virgin America air flights from Logan International
Airport in Boston, Massachusetts to California can access “naughty” websites). Interestingly, the
annual revenues from the hotel industry’s in-room sale of pornographic movies has been placed at
approximately $500 million. DINES, supra note 96, at 52.
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3. Victimless Offenses or Causal Theories?
Although the laws that regulate the business practices of SOBs may be
considered both a “rational means of promoting ends,” and efficient, laws of
this character are nevertheless “inefficacious” because the secondary effects
and actual criminal conduct subsequent to allowing SOBs to operate under
zoning codes “are either de jure or de facto victimless.” 113 Indeed, the very
“fact of victimization is frequently unascertainable.”114
One theory posits that pornography does not only eroticize male
sexual-violence toward women by predisposing males to rape, but that it also
actually intensifies “the predisposition in other males already so disposed.”115
Put directly, pornography “undermines some males’ internal inhibitions against
acting out their desire to rape”116 and promotes sexual arousal for some.117
The conclusion, then, is that a causal link exists that establishes a clear
connection between pornography and social harm118—“pornography causes
rape,”119 discriminates against and commodifies women,120 and has an
insidious effect on the psyche.121
113. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1, at 204, 213–14; see POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, supra note 11, § 5.7 (discussing the regulation of sexual behavior and its economic
impact). The mid-twentieth century saw the creation of adult-use districts, or special-disorder
zones referred to as “red-light districts,” where the sex industry was concentrated and derelict
housing for the unemployed (termed “skid rows”) was placed. NICOLE STELLE GARNETT,
ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA
102–04 (2010).
Boston’s adult-use district, formerly the city’s old red-light district, included
adult-entertainment venues, pornographic book stores, and strip clubs, and became known as the
“Combat Zone.” Scott Van Voorhis, Wrecking Ball Ready for Combat: Towers Will Replace Red
Lights, BOS. HERALD, Aug. 20, 2003, at 34. Authorities decided to demolish and replace these
businesses with apartment towers. Id.; cf. Nate Schweber, Towns Use Zoning to Limit Sex
Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at 6 (discussing zoning laws in some New Jersey
municipalities that regulate SOBs by placing them, for example, only in the industrial areas).
114. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1, at 204.
115. DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIPS: PORNOGRAPHY, MISOGYNY, AND
RAPE 119–20 (1998).
116. Id.
117. GEORGE P. SMITH II, FAMILY VALUES AND THE NEW SOCIETY: DILEMMAS OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 187 (1998).
118. RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 156.
119. Id.
120. PAMELA PAUL, PORNIFIED: HOW PORNOGRAPHY IS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES, OUR
RELATIONSHIPS, AND OUR FAMILIES 242–43, 275 (2005).
121. Pamela Paul, The Cost of Growing up on Porn, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2010, at B5; see
HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON DECENCY, LAW, AND
PORNOGRAPHY 64 (1996) (“The purpose [of pornography]—to arouse an elemental passion for
other people’s bodies independently of any affection or regard for a particular person—virtually
guarantees that human beings will be represented as instruments.”). Whether “inflaming [one’s]
sexual passions” can result in harm depends upon one’s perceptions. Andrew Koppelman, Does
Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1641–42 (2005).
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The opposing, and less emotional theory, acknowledges that objective proof
of a direct link between attitude and behavior that causes harm needs more
empirical research122 because there is insufficient evidence from psychological
experiments that show any concrete connection between social attitudes and
behavioral harm such as rape or criminal aggression.123 Correlations, at
whatever level or degree, cannot be taken as proof of a definitive cause,
however.124 Other sources of social violence have been found to be more of a
catalyst for aggression than pornography.125 Such sources include “unstable or
disturbed family life, physical and emotional abuse by parents . . . chronic
unemployment, drug and alcohol abuse, [and] mental illness.”126 Considered
to be the most powerful of all sources of aggressive behavior, even more than
sexual desire, is “the basic need to be regarded as a man.”127
II. NUISANCE AS AN EFFECTIVE LAND-USE TOOL
Through its publication in 1979 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
specifically sections 827 and 828, the American Law Institute (ALI) sought to
resolve previously expressed concerns regarding the instability of the law of
nuisance.128 The ALI listed specific, objective factors to be considered when
assessing whether the gravity of a plaintiff’s harm or injury is, when weighed
against the utility of a defendant’s conduct, so unreasonable that he may seek
redress for injunctive relief or damages under the law of nuisance.129
Under the Restatement, the five factors for testing the claim of unreasonable
conduct under nuisance, which in essence become a template for
decision-making both at the initial stage of pleading and in subsequent judicial
determinations, are:
(a) the extent of the harm involved;
122. Public opinion surveys cannot be determinative of this issue; rather, social-scientific
evidence is required. L. W. SUMNER, THE HATEFUL AND THE OBSCENE: STUDIES IN THE LIMITS
OF FREE EXPRESSION 124 (2004).
Recent statistical studies by Professor Todd Kendall of Clemson University show that
expanded Internet access to pornography may well reduce the incidence of rape and validate other
current studies concluding that its use does not cause crimes of this motive. Steve Chapman,
Does Pornography Cause Sexual Violence?, WASH. EXAMINER, Jan. 12, 2011, at 24.
123. GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY 108
(1998). Non-violent pornography, which accounts for the vast bulk available commercially to the
public, has been shown by some studies to actually reduce aggression. Nadine Strossen, A
Feminist Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1182
(1993); see Chapman, supra note 122, at 24.
124. F. M. Christensen, Elicitation of Violence: The Evidence, in PORNOGRAPHY: PRIVATE
RIGHT OR PUBLIC MENACE? 221, 225 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1991).
125. Id. at 237–39.
126. Id. at 239.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827–28 (1979).
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(b) the character of the harm involved;
(c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or
enjoyment invaded;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality; and
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.130
Under the Restatement, a finding that interference with a public right is
unreasonable and, thus, actionable requires a consideration of
(a) [w]hether the conduct involves a significant interference with
the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public
comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.131
Traditionally, claims asserting public nuisance have allowed only public
authorities to be the moving party132 and, further, have allowed injunctive,
rather than legal, relief.133 Over the course of time in some jurisdictions,
however, private parties have been permitted to maintain actions under public
nuisance if they can show that they have suffered a “special injury,” in other
words, if they can show an injury unique in some way from a general injury to
the public.134 Notably, actions considered damaging to public morals, and
therefore actionable under a claim of public nuisance (for example, indecent
exposure and prostitution), have been allowed since the earliest recognition of
the tort of nuisance.135 Consequently, the allowance, licensing, and placement
130. Id. § 827. Section 828 provides:
In determining the utility of conduct that cases an intentional invasion of another’s
interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are important:
the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct;
the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and
the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.
Id. § 828.
131. Id. § 821B.
132. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 741, 745–46 (2003).
133. Id. at 814 (“Historically, the recovery of damages has been an ancillary and unusual
remedy when a public nuisance was found to exist.”).
134. Id.; see also Matthew Saunig, Note, Rebranding Public Nuisance: City of Cleveland v.
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. as a Failed Response to Economic Crisis, 59 CATH. U. L.
REV. 911. 929–30 (2010) (analyzing the proper limits of public nuisance claims and cautioning
against an unjustified expansion of this tort).
135. See William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997,
999–1000 (1966).
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of an SOB within a zoning district raises the issue of when these actions by a
municipal authority are reasonable, non-confiscatory (that is, they are not an
unlawful taking), and not subject to an action for inverse condemnation by
neighborhood property owners.136
A. Nuisances as Takings
Can a nuisance ever ripen into a taking? This is an intriguing question
requiring an analysis that exceeds the scope of this Article.137 It is nonetheless
important to note that some courts have chosen to collapse nuisance into the
takings determination, effectively treating nuisance as a per se taking.138
Others “equate nuisance . . . with regulatory takings.”139 Furthermore, the
government may effect a taking when it “uses its own property in ways that
interfere with the ability of other owners to use and enjoy their properties.140
Accordingly, nuisance law and takings display a “lack of doctrinal
coherence.”141
As early as 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the extent to which a
government could authorize or create a nuisance.142 In Baltimore & Potomac
Railroad Co. v. First Baptist Church, the Court concluded that even though
“Congress could authorize and immunize” actions that could be taken to be
public nuisances—in this case the operation of a railroad and related
facilities—Congress could not undertake such actions that would, in turn,

136. See Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 819, 820–23 (2006).
137. For a comprehensive treatment of this issue see generally Ball, supra note 136, and
Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 WASH. UNIV. J.L. & POL’Y 149
(2000).
138. Ball, supra note 136, at 851–55.
139. Id. at 824.
140. Id. at 820.
141. Id. at 821–22.
142. See Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 330–32 (1883).
More recently, in the 1992 case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court held that
when legislative measures deprive property of all economically viable use and do not derive from
property and nuisance principles, they constitute a taking. 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). Justice
Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, attempted to structure a test for determining the
appropriateness of a “total taking inquiry.” Id. at 1030–31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under this test, as with nuisance law issues, Justice Scalia sought to evaluate,
among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent
private property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities, the social value of the
claimant’s activities and their suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant
and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme Court Solves
the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 147, 151–54 (1995) (discussing the significance
of the Lucas holding).
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create a private nuisance.143 Because the burdens of such actions are imposed
upon a small number of owners, no immunization is proper.144
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,
expanded on its previous holding in 1883 in First Baptist Church.145 The
Court found that, when the land is used by the government or a private party
acting with explicit governmental authority in a way that creates a nuisance,
the use rises to a taking when the burden placed on the aggrieved party is
“peculiar and substantial.”146 The components of this taking standard continue
to confound.147
B. Inverse Condemnation
Inverse condemnation is another remedial option available for recovering
damages that result from indirect government actions that have the effect of
causing a physical invasion to a plaintiff’s land, such as zoning
accommodations and allowances for sexually oriented, adult businesses.148
Unless a moving party proves the injury sustained from such an invasion is a
foreseeable result of the zoning, however, any recovery under an action for
inverse condemnation is likely to suffer a “noncognizable derivative taking.”149
In 2007, a classic issue of inverse condemnation, combined with issues of
land use and zoning, as well as nudity, race, and sexuality, arose when the
Washington, D.C., City Council decided to relocate up to six adult clubs where
pornographic movies were showed, nude dancing occurred, and private sex
booths existed.150 The relocation of these SOBs, previously in Ward 6 of the
city, was due to the development of the Washington Nationals baseball
stadium, which had the effect of displacing primarily those venues that were
homosexually oriented.151 Residents of Ward 5, who are predominantly lowincome, objected to the effort to move all of the displaced clubs to their
neighborhoods, fearing that this business cluster would not only depress the
already low real-estate values of private homes there, but also condemn Ward

143. Ball, supra note 136, at 827–28 (citing Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co., 108 U.S. at 332).
144. Id. (citing Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co., 108 U.S. at 332).
145. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1924).
146. Id.
147. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of
the Takings Clause: A Reply to Professor Claeys, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 231 (2004). Thornburg v.
Portland is regarded as the most important nuisance/takings decision of a state court. Ball, supra
note 136, at 851 (citing Thornburg v. Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 110 (Or. 1963) (suggesting
nuisance effects a taking).
148. GARNETT, supra note 113, at 105.
149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Yolanda Woodlee, NE Residents Fear Clubs Bill Would Create a ‘Red-Light Zone,’
WASH. POST, June 5, 2007, at B1.
151. Id.
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5 to little more than a “red light” district.152 The City Council settled the issue
by directing that no more than two SOBs would be allowed in each of the eight
city wards and that, in order to avoid clustering these operations, there must be
1200 feet between the clubs.153
Concentrating disorder in a particular zone has proven to amplify it, thereby
causing spillovers to nearby neighborhoods adjacent to the zone of
containment.154 Thus, many cities have opted, instead, for dispersing SOBs,155
which has the practical effect of merely moving the problem elsewhere.
C. Moral Nuisances
Under contemporary community standards, nuisance also has been defined
as activity that is taken to be “unneighborly.”156 Immoral activity or conduct
spawned from the placement and operation of SOBs could be seen, properly,
as unneighborly.157 Consequently, some proffer a theory of moral nuisance as
an additional remedy to fight immoral activity associated with the operation of
SOBs.158
Four presumptions are central to the functional applicability of moral
nuisance: (1) “that the conduct of one’s neighbor can be judged immoral”; (2)
“that such conduct causes real harms”; (3) “that those harms can be remedied
by the law”; (4) “that what one does on one’s own land can be limited by the
moral sensibilities of one’s neighbors”; and (5) that courts are qualified to
render judgments on activities of this nature.159 The three decisive factors
necessary to establishing an action for moral nuisance are “the value of a
defendant’s activity, the location of the defendant’s activity, and . . . the harm
suffered by the plaintiff.”160 When the activity the moving party complains of

152. Id.
153. Yolanda Woodlee, District Passes Amended Bill on Relocating of Nude Clubs, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2007, at B1; see also Elissa Silberman, Neighbors Protest at Reputed Sex Shop,
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2007, at B4 (discussing the outrage of luxury condominium owners in a
Washington, D.C. neighborhood regarding a Fun Fair Video store that had been operating
illegally as a sex shop for more than a decade).
154. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1107 (2005).
155. Id. at 1108; see Debbie Howlett, Sex Shops Infiltrate Small Towns, USA TODAY, Dec. 4,
2003, at 3A (discussing the move of SOBs into smaller towns due to the dispersal methods used
by larger cities).
156. See Robert Ellickson, Alternative to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as
Land Use Control, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 748–49 (1973).
157. See Drew Lucas, Comment, There is a Porn Store in Mr. Roger’s Neighborhood: Will
You Be Their Neighbor? How to Apply Residential Use Restrictive Covenants to Modern Home
Businesses, 26 CAMPBELL L. REV. 123, 123–24 (2004) (discussing a web site that streams video
of five women engaging in sexual activity who live in a Florida home unrestricted by zoning
ordinances despite the complaints of neighbors).
158. Nagle, supra note 34, 266–69.
159. Id. at 268.
160. Id. at 312–13.
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is both immoral and illegal, the claim of moral nuisance is strengthened
considerably.161 A judgment regarding the morality of the challenged conduct
must be grounded in the norms of the community in which a plaintiff
resides.162 This, then, becomes a central weakness of the theory because
determining those normative standards of morality is fraught with
challenges.163
D. Combating a Central Weakness
The central concern for applying the theory of moral nuisance can, perhaps,
be resolved in large measure by relying on the secondary-effects doctrine.164
More specifically, if a municipality can justify its regulation of SOBs based on
comparative studies of other cities addressing this issue or other evidence
which substantiates a reasonable belief165 that certain activities would degrade
the moral character or fiber of the community by promoting prostitution and
illegal drug use, such as the retail sale of pornographic literature and
paraphernalia, that municipality could seek to block the placement of such an
immoral business by utilizing this doctrine and the law of anticipatory
nuisance.166 If such a business had already been opened, its offensive moral
character could be recognized and an action in equity could be undertaken to
close the business as a public moral nuisance.167

161. Id. at 269.
162. Id.; see Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1642 (describing “moral relativism,” the
idea that determining morality is “relative to the moral code of the particular culture in which the
claim is advanced”).
163. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1640–41; supra Part I.
164. See infra Part IV.C.
165. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438–39 (2002); City of
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986); Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of
Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 722–23, 727 (7th Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit in Ben’s Bar, Inc.
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s “road map of sorts” for testing the constitutionality of liquor
regulations for adult-entertainment businesses that it discussed in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island. Ben’s Bar, Inc., 316 F.3d at 713 (citing Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
505 (1996)). In Ben’s Bar, Inc., however, the Seventh Circuit was careful to draw a distinction
between zoning ordinances, or public indecency statutes, and adult-entertainment liquor
regulations. Id. at 714.
166. George P. Smith II, Re-validating the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV.
687, 688, 696–97 (2005). Under the tort of anticipatory nuisance, a plaintiff endeavors to prevent
actions that will become nuisances in due course. Id. at 697. Although recognized at common
law, and statutorily in Alabama and Georgia, this tort is seldom used because of an excessively
high and complex burden of evidentiary proof, for example “reasonable certainty or high
probability,” required to sustain its success. Id. at 688, 703.
167. Daria Snadowsky, Note, The Best Little Whorehouse is Not in Texas: How Nevada’s
Prostitution Laws Serve Public Policy, and How Those Laws May Be Improved, 6 NEV. L.J. 217,
223 (2005) (quoting Kuban v. McGimsey, 605 P.2d 623, 627 (Nev. 1980)) (stating that properly
exercised police powers may be used to prohibit previously lawful businesses that are deemed
injurious to the public).
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Also, an argument could be advanced which asserts that SOBs are, in their
signage and other forms of visual advertisement and window displays often
with provocatively posed mannequins, aesthetically unbalanced, unreasonable,
and inconsistent with either the moral and historic character or business tone of
the neighborhood in which they are located.168 In other words, that SOBs are
aesthetic nuisances.169
In modern practice, addressing moral grounds as a justification for
regulating personal liberties, which include operating and allowing public
access to SOBs, is not uniformly accepted as a valid reason to impose land-use
control regulations.170 Indeed, some commentators argue that the resolution of
complex moral issues and the restraint of social behavior by and through
zoning is inappropriate.171
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003
forbidding state regulation of sexual intimacies among consenting adults,172 it
remains an open question whether morality by way of legislative actions taken
to maintain a level of sexual morality is a legitimate state goal sufficient to
abridge the personal freedoms of privacy and free association, or whether such
attempts for restraint must be seen as preserving public health, safety, or
welfare.173 Determinations of society’s objections and policy preferences for
land development are essential to testing the effectiveness of land-use law.174
What is certain, however, is that the state must act, consistent with the exercise
of its police powers, to maintain order within society.175 It is inconceivable
and illogical to argue that a personal right of sexual expression should be
expanded to state-regulated public business, thus subjecting those businesses to
strict constitutional review by the judiciary whenever this right is compromised
or disallowed.

168. See George P. Smith II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic
Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 53, 66–69, 80–83 (1991); Allison
Klein, In Old Town, The Sex Shop is a Kiss-Off, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2009, at A1.
169. Smith & Fernandez, supra note 168, at 66–69, 80–83; see also Klein, supra note 168
(discussing the anger of the residents and businesses over the opening of an SOB called “Le
Tache” in a historic neighborhood in Alexandria, Virginia).
170. KENNETH R. WING ET AL., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 146 (2007).
171. Thomas B. Griffen, Zoning Away the Evils of Alcohol, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1374,
1397–99 (1988); see also ERIC DAMIAN KELLY & CONNIE COOPER, EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS
WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT REGULATING SEX BUSINESSES 69–72 (2000) (discussing measures
taken by local governments to regulate SOBs).
172. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
173. WING ET AL., supra note 170.
174. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 5, at 1.
175. WING ET AL., supra note 170 (noting that, when the states began to vary their exercise
of the police power regarding issues of morality, controversy ensued).

426

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 60:403

E. Public Health Nuisances
In the early stages of national awareness of the public health hazards
associated with the spread of HIV-AIDS, nuisance was, and still is for that
matter, a potent weapon for closing places of assignation and debauchery as
public nuisances, such as bathhouses.176 Many of these businesses have now
“converted” themselves into private clubs;177 yet they continue to be subjected
to closure as public health nuisances.178
Because it is concerned with private sexual activity, Lawrence v. Texas179 is
of little, if any, real value to the assertion of a constitutional guarantee to
freedom of sexual association and intimacy on properties that must be licensed
within a community under a proper zoning scheme.180 It strains the limits of
credulity to assert that the Lawrence rule applies to sexual expression in
publicly licensed venues. Reinventing a bathhouse or other SOB into a private
club, for example, still requires a business license, and it is argued that
allowing fornication and other sexual perversions in establishments of this
order is improper, immoral, and inconsistent with preserving the common good
through the advancement of sound public-health policy.181
Although land-use regulations and zoning ordinances are in many ways the
preferred tools for regulating SOBs,182 more and more communities utilizing
detailed operational land controls, which embody business-licensing
ordinances, rather than only zoning plans, are finding better levels of success
176. See City of N.Y. v. New Saint Mark’s Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982–84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986) (granting an injunction against a bathhouse for public nuisance purposes, noting that the
injunction is not violative of constitutional rights); see also GAY HISTORIES AND CULTURES 103
(George E. Haggerty ed. 2000) (describing bathhouse closures in California, Minnesota, and New
York). Interestingly, every major city in the United States has a gay bathhouse. Gillian Telling,
Bathhouses, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 6, 2005, at 90.
177. GAY HISTORIES AND CULTURES, supra note 176 (“In New York, both commercial and
private sex clubs have replaced the baths as places for men to gather and have sex . . . .”);
Michele Garcia, From Peep Shows to the Look of Luxury: Ten Years After Crackdown, Skin
Business Has New Image, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2005, at A3 (detailing how the “skin business” of
New York City has transitioned into an upscale industry by transforming x-rated and peep show
theaters into clubs or adult bars that continue to provide various venues for promiscuous sexual
entertainment).
178. GAY HISTORIES AND CULTURES, supra note 176; see also Rachel Simon, Note, New
York City’s Restrictive Zoning of Adult Oriented Businesses: A Constitutional Analysis, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 188, 202–03 (1995) (analyzing New York City’s Adult-Zoning
Resolution and discussing the closing of adult businesses under the nuisance doctrine).
179. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see Christian J. Grostic, Note, Evolving
Objective Standards: A Developmental Approach to Constitutional Review of Morals Legislation,
105 MICH. L. REV. 151, 152 (2006) (maintaining Lawrence adopted John Stuart Mill’s harm
principle under which “morality inspired government action [is permitted] only when it is
supported by reference to empirical or otherwise demonstrable harms”).
180. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (noting that “public conduct” was not at issue in the case,
and prohibiting the state from declaring private sexual conduct a crime).
181. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
182. Nagle, supra note 34, at 321.
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in regulating SOBs.183 This is because licensing permits compliant businesses
to operate and provides a procedure for simply closing business operations that
violate the strict provisions of the license.184 Although considered especially
effective as a tool for regulating on-premise entertainment by SOBs, licensing
is more problematic when policing bookstores distributing obscene and
pornographic literature and selling sex paraphernalia, all of which are protected
free speech expressions under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.185
Because of the variety of uses promoted by SOBs, it is preferable to
recognize each business as a “separate land-use category.”186 For example,
[m]ixing lingerie, leather goods, and sexually oriented media or
adding sex toys to the product mix of a retail outlet causes it to take
on the image of selling sex, which makes it very different from a
store that sells books or videos, some of which happen to be sexually
oriented. . . . These stores [should] be referred to as “sex shops.”187
Additionally, entertainment presented in closed booths or private rooms is
clearly within the definition of an SOB.188 Classifying business conduct can, as
seen, be quite complicated.
In those cases where, for politically sensitive reasons or economically
motivated ones resulting from restricted enforcement budgets, governmental
“solutions” to regulating SOBs are too complicated, nuisance law is a potent
weapon to consider.189 Guided by a common-sense application of sections
821B, 827, and 828 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,190 the law of
nuisance has a place in contemporary land-use control.191 The one real caveat
for engrafting the theory of moral nuisance onto the general law of nuisance is
the substantial difficulty in determining when personal and community
standards of morality are so offended by the operations of SOBs that they
become actionable in equity.192 As observed, perhaps the one hope for
“activating” a claim for abatement of a moral nuisance would be through
reliance on the doctrine of secondary effects to show evidentiary proof of the
claim.193
183. KELLY & COOPER, supra note 171, at 162.
184. Id.
185. Id.; see also infra Part III.B.
186. KELLY & COOPER, supra note 171, at 156.
187. Id. at 157–58.
188. Id. at 158.
189. See Ellickson, supra note 156, at 719, 762.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 827–28 (1979).
191. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
192. See Nagle, supra note 34, at 299–300 (explaining that, in order for a moral objection to
become a basis for a nuisance claim, the “moral objection must be commonly held in the
community,” but determining community standards may be problematic because “[d]ifferent
communities have different norms of morality”).
193. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
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III. HISTORY OF REGULATING OBSCENITY
A. Early American Attempts
Early regulation of obscenity194 in the United States followed the lead of
regulation in England.195 Primarily, obscenity regulation was inspired by the
religious community and guided by the prospect of offense to churches, as
opposed to being focused on the actual sexual content of the material.196
Protecting the religious communities remained the central focus of obscenity
enforcement in the United States until the 1800s.197 Although the individual
states began to enact anti-obscenity laws in the early 1820s,198 a strong federal
presence was not felt in obscenity regulation until after the Civil War.199
Under the leadership of Anthony Comstock, following passage of a federal law
that prohibited the mailing of obscene material, an era of heightened
enforcement began.200

194. “Obscene refers to that which is repugnant or disgusting to the senses, or offensive,
filthy, foul, repulsive, or loathsome. . . . Pornography, on the other hand, derived from the Greek
word for harlot . . . is limited to depictions of sexual lewdness or erotic behavior.” FREDERICK F.
SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 1 n.1 (1976). “[W]hile all pornography is obscene, the
converse does not hold good. In other words, obscene matter, which produces feelings of disgust,
may be, but is not necessarily, pornographic as well.” H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, A HISTORY OF
PORNOGRAPHY 2 (1965). This quote from 1965 is no longer the absolute it once was. Under the
community-based test for obscenity that is now employed, all pornography cannot be presumed
obscene; indeed, in Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that “sex and obscenity are
not synonymous.” 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
195. SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 8.
196. See id. at 3. “[T]he Christian and common law tradition . . . [regulated sexual
expression] only incidentally to the regulation of some other offense (especially blasphemy) and
never as an end in itself.” Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT’L L.
299, 305 (2008).
197. SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 10 (explaining the factors that prompted state legislatures
to attempt to control sexually oriented materials in the 1800s); Boyce, supra note 196, at 312
(“During the nineteenth century, in America even more than in Britain, obscenity began to be
decoupled from the offenses with which it had historically been closely intertwined: sedition and
blasphemy.”).
198. See SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 10.
199. See id. (discussing the enactment and effect of federal legislation regarding obscene
material); Boyce, supra note 196, at 313 (same). Although the first federal law dealing with
obscenity was passed in 1842 to stifle the distribution of imported French postcards, “few federal
prosecutions resulted.” Boyce, supra note 196, at 313; see also SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 10
(“The years prior to the Civil War witnesses a proliferation of obscenity and lewdness statutes,
but there were still few prosecutions.”).
200. SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 12–13. Comstock championed the first federal obscenity
law and was appointed to direct its enforcement at a national level. Id. at 12. Comstock touted
his first-year enforcement accomplishments as including the seizure and destruction of “200,000
pictures and photographs; 100,000 books; [and] 5,000 packs of playing cards.” Id. at 13. Over
his career, Comstock is said to have destroyed nearly 160 tons of obscene material and to have
bragged about prompting fifteen suicides. Boyce, supra note 196, at 313–14.
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Early obscenity laws presented the same central issue found in enacting and
enforcing modern-day laws regulating obscenity: the lack of a definition of
obscenity.201 In the absence of a statutory definition of obscenity, the courts
borrowed the standard that was then utilized in England—the Hicklin test.202
Under the Hicklin test, to determine whether something was obscene, the court
had to decide whether the item “would have a tendency to deprave and corrupt
the minds of those into whose hands the publication might fall.”203 This test
did not apply a reasonable person standard; instead, it coddled the citizenry by
presuming that the possible audience included impressionable children, thus
reducing the obscenity standard to a protectionist footing.204 Through the
application of the Hicklin test, courts made ad hoc determinations of obscenity
in particular publications; however, “in none of these cases did any court deal
with the fundamental relationship between obscenity and the First
Amendment.”205
B. Transitioning to Community-Based Standards for Defining Obscenity
The Supreme Court finally began to analyze obscenity regulation from a
constitutional standpoint in 1957.206 In Roth v. United States, the Court

201. Boyce, supra note 196, at 314. Black’s Law Dictionary defines obscenity as “[t]he
characteristic or state of being morally abhorrent or socially taboo, esp[ecially] as a result or
referring to or depicting sexual or excretory functions.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004). The Oxford English Dictionary defines obscene as “abominable, disgusting, filthy, [and]
indecent.” THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 656 (2d ed. 1989).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 732, 733 (E.D. Mo. 1889) (citing R. v. Hicklin,
(1868) 3 Law Reports 360 (Q.B.) 371) (adopting the obscenity standard announced in England).
203. Id.
One of the significant aspects of the Hicklin test . . . is that the obscenity vel non of a
book, pamphlet, magazine, or picture was to be evaluated not in terms of its effect on
the hypothetical “average man,” but by its effect on anyone who might in fact
conceivably read it.
SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 15–16.
204. See SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 15–16.
205. Id. at 29. The Hicklin test persisted in the American judicial system—albeit weakening
over time—from the early 1800s until the early half of the twentieth century, leading up to the
1950s when the Supreme Court analyzed obscenity from a First Amendment standpoint and
created a standard for obscenity based more on the reasonable man than on vulnerable children.
See Boyce, supra note 196, at 314–16; see, e.g., Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir.
1945) (concluding that a publication’s effect on an ordinary person should determine if it is
obscene); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930) (arguing that material is not
obscene merely because a child might gain access to a publication); United States v. One Book
Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (concluding that the definition of obscene
must be judged based on the average person).
206. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (“[T]his is the first time the
question has been squarely presented to this Court, either under the First Amendment or under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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directly addressed the First Amendment issues raised by attempts to stifle
obscene speech and publications.207 The Court recognized that
[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection
of the guaranties [of freedom of speech], unless excludable because
they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.208
Therefore, the Court provided a more workable and realistic way to
distinguish between unprotected, obscene speech and protected, non-obscene
speech.209
In fashioning the new test—which discarded the Hicklin test—the Court
stated that the First Amendment protected speech that furthered political or
social growth, not all speech.210 More specifically, the First Amendment did
not protect speech that appealed only to a person’s prurient interests.211 The
Court did not, however, note in its repudiation of the Hicklin test that the test
was overbroad and may have included material that dealt with sex in a
legitimate fashion.212
In rejecting the Hicklin test, the Roth Court cobbled together elements from
various tests used by lower courts.213 The Court set forth the following new
test: “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest.”214 Following the announcement of this test in 1957,
obscenity law transitioned from assuming that everything pornographic was

207. Id. at 479 & n.1 (“[T]he primary constitutional question is whether the federal obscenity
statute violates the provision of the First Amendment that ‘Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .’” (omissions in original)).
208. Id. at 484.
209. See id. at 489.
210. Id. at 483–84.
211. Id. (“The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.”). The Court noted that “[o]bscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest.” Id. at 487. The Court defined this type of material as “material
having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.” Id.
212. Id. at 489 (“The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon
the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and
so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedom of speech and press.”).
213. Id. at 489 & n.26.
214. Id. at 489; see Stephen Gillers, A Tendency to Deprave and Corrupt: The
Transformation of American Obscenity Law from Hicklin to Ulysses II, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
215, 296 (2007) (discussing how the Court’s decision in Ulysses set the stage for the test the
Supreme Court would later develop to replace Hicklin).
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obscene to a community-based legal area in which not even “all hard-core
pornography . . . qualified as obscene.”215
Following fifteen years of the Supreme Court reversing community-based
determinations of obscenity,216 a new test was announced in 1973.217 The
Court, in Miller v. California, set forth a three-part test:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.218
The Court responded to the inevitable criticism of the fluid application of a
reasonable person, community-based test by stating: “[t]he mere fact juries
may reach different conclusions as to the same material does not mean that
constitutional rights are abridged.”219 Further, the Court clarified that only the
first and second prongs of the Miller test are truly community-based standards,
leaving the value-judgment prong as a reasonable person test, not in a certain
community, but generally.220 Drawing on the opinion in Roth, which stated the
importance of protecting unpopular ideas,221 the Court wrote that “the ideas a
work represents need not obtain majority approval to merit protection.”222
Therefore, the government does not abridge a First Amendment right if the
material is judged by a reasonable person to appeal to a person’s prurient

215. John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 296
(2009); see also supra note 200.
216. Boyce, supra note 196, at 317–18 (“[T]he court ‘systematically Redrupped—reviewed
and reversed summarily, without further opinion—scores of obscenity rulings entered by lower
state and federal courts.’” (quoting EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE: THE
LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS 515 (1992))); see also Redrup v. New York,
386 U.S. 767, 770–71 (1967) (per curiam).
217. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
218. Id. (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Id. at 26 n.9.
220. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987). Interestingly, American laws attempt,
often with little success, to differentiate between obscene nudity and artistic nudity that has
redeeming social value. Randall Bezanson & Andrew Finkelman, Trespassory Art, 43 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 245, 249 (2010); see also PHILIP CARR-GOMM, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NAKEDNESS
148–49, 255, 257 (2010) (discussing the American perception of nakedness); Flashing Flesh: The
Politics of Nudity, THE ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 79 (reviewing PHILIP CARR-GOMM, A BRIEF
HISTORY OF NAKEDNESS (2010), and discussing the dynamics of politics and the cultural norms
that shape society’s response to nakedness); Blake Gopnik, In Art We Lust: At Second Blush,
Classic Works Are Allowed to Rise to Their Full Erotic Potential, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2009, at
E1 (observing that “[a]ny culture that thinks ‘sex’ when it sees naked bodies, will still think sex
when it sees pictures of them,” regardless of their artistic provenance).
221. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
222. Pope, 481 U.S. at 500.
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interest and if the work, taken as a whole and weighed against a national
standard, offers no value to society.223
Although a finding that an establishment is obscene allows a community to
completely ban it from operating, finding that a business deals only in nonobscene materials does not end the inquiry.224 The Supreme Court has allowed
for heightened zoning requirements for even non-obscene SOBs.225
IV. ZONING LAW AND SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESSES
A. Overview of Zoning Schemes
Zoning is a use of local governments’ delegated police powers to
“exercise . . . the right to control the use of real property.”226 “The essence of
zoning is to provide a balanced and well ordered scheme for all activity
deemed essential to the particular municipality.”227 Zoning schemes can be
established as exclusionary or cumulative depending on the desires of the local
government implementing the scheme.228 An exclusionary scheme restricts the
use of the zoned area to only the use for which it is particularly zoned, while a
cumulative scheme allows the use for which it is zoned in addition to any
higher use, such as residential use.229 Within a master zoning plan, there may
be isolated instances where land is zoned for a purpose outside the character of
223. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (providing that, among the considerations to determine if
material is obscene, is “whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value”); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.56, at 1383 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing the third element of the Miller test and emphasizing
that the value of the work depends on the perspective of a reasonable person).
224. See infra Part IV.C.1.
225. See Young v. Mini Am. Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) (discussing zoning laws
relevant to all motion-picture theatres, not just those showing adult films).
226. Platte Cnty. v. Chipman, 512 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (“Such [zoning]
power is not enjoyed by lesser governing bodies, such as, counties and municipalities, in the
absence of specific grant or delegation to such bodies by the sovereign.”).
Police power is a concept of obscure and ancient origins. The police power, which
protects the state and ensures citizens’ rights against one another is founded on one of
the most ancient principles of English common law. This principle is commonly
expressed in the old legal maxim: “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,” which is
loosely translated as, “enjoy your property in such manner as to not injure that of
another.”
6 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 35.02[1], at 35-3 (Eric Damian Kelly
ed., 2010); see also Smith, Nuisance Law, supra note 7, at 680 (“No doubt the most
well-established or inherent principle of the law of nuisance as well as its most contentious is to
be found in the principle of Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.”).
227. J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 290 A.2d 452, 456 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1972). “The purpose of zoning is to reduce or eliminate the adverse effects that one type of land
use might have on another.” King v. Caddo Parish Comm’n, 719 So.2d 410, 415 (La. 1998).
228. 7 ROHAN, supra note 226, § 39.03, at 39-37 to 39-38.
229. Id.
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the surrounding land.230 These isolated parcels are said to have been spot
zoned, a practice that is usually considered suspect based on the overriding
need for uniformity and the belief that the original zoning classification was
purposeful and well thought out.231
Zoning ordinances enacted to control the location of SOBs would, in most
instances, be considered reverse spot zoning.232 A general constitutional
challenge to spot zoning may lie in procedural due process, which requires
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.233 In the zoning or re-zoning
of SOBs, however, more is at play. In addition to the typical zoning challenge
based on procedural due process, the owner of an SOB would have a cause of
action based in the abridgement of his First Amendment right to free speech
and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.234 Specifically, in
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court, in order to balance the
rights of the owner of an SOB with the interests of the community, had to
formulate a test which took into account the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of the owner and the presumptive enforceability of zoning laws
formulated under the police powers.235

230. Id. § 38A.01, at 38A-3.
231. Id. § 38A.01, at 38A-10.
232. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, § 5.10, at 192–93. Reverse spot
zoning implies that, instead of special affirmative treatment for a particular parcel of land, the
parcel in question is more restrictively zoned than its neighboring parcels. 6 ROHAN, supra note
226, § 38A.01, at 38A-9. “Such action generally has been held to be invalid as unjustifiably
discriminatory unless the interests of the community as a whole are served thereby.” Id.
233. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985).
The plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the
litigation, whether in person or through counsel. The notice must be the best
practicable, “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”
Id. at 812 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
235. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (“[I]t must be said
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.”); see also JULES B. GERARD, LOCAL REGULATION OF ADULT BUSINESSES §§ 2.02, 2.08
(2004 ed.) (discussing the Supreme Court position on the First Amendment and providing an
explanation of due process). Nuisance actions provide another option for controlling the influx or
growth of SOBs outside the zoning context. See Nagle, supra note 34, at 267–68. Private
landowners affected by the secondary effects, which governments seek to limit, may have an
action against the neighboring business owner for a moral nuisance. See id. A moral nuisance
action “presumes that what one does on one’s own land can be limited by the moral sensibilities
of one’s neighbor.” Id. at 268.
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B. The Interplay of Obscenity Regulation and Zoning Law
Zoning, as an application of a government’s police powers, must be related
to the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the governed public.236 When,
however, a community is zoning SOBs, a two-step inquiry is required.237 First,
there must be a determination under the Miller test238 of whether the material
distributed by the SOB is obscene.239 If the material is classified as obscene,
then it is offered no protection under the First Amendment and the business
can be prohibited altogether.240 If, however, the material is deemed to be
non-obscene, but still sexually oriented, the Supreme Court has recognized a
community’s right to restrict the location of the distributing business.241 The
determination to restrict the location of SOBs must be based, however, on
something other than the desire to suppress non-obscene speech, otherwise
known as the secondary-effects doctrine.242
C. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. and the Secondary-Effects Doctrine
1. The Introduction of the Secondary-Effects Doctrine
In 1972, Detroit enacted zoning ordinances that differentiated “between
motion picture theaters which exhibit sexually explicit ‘adult’ movies and
those which do not.”243 Those theaters that do exhibit adult movies were
restricted from being “located within 1,000 feet of any two other ‘regulated
uses’ or within 500 feet of a residential area.”244 These ordinances, which

236. Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
237. See Simon, supra note 178, at 192–95.
238. See supra text accompanying note 218.
239. See Simon, supra note 178, at 192–93.
240. Id. at 193–94.
241. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–73 (1976) (holding that placing
location restrictions on SOBs does not violate the Equal Protection Clause). It has been
suggested that the courts have, over time, used three tests to determine whether ordinances
restricting SOBs are constitutional: a “population proportion test”; a “total acreage test”; and a
“supply and demand test.” Ashley C. Phillips, Comment, A Matter of Arithmetic: Using Supply
and Demand to Determine the Constitutionality of Adult Entertainment Zoning Ordinances, 51
EMORY L. REV. 319, 321–22 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Another approach
essentially collapses the second and the third tests listed above into one. See Matthew L.
McGinnis, Note, Sex, but Not in the City: Adult-Entertainment Zoning, the First Amendment, and
Residential and Rural Municipalities, 46 B.C. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2005) (discussing the Renton
test and considering the Supreme Court’s treatment of “adult-entertainment zoning”).
242. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986) (noting that
content-based restrictions on speech are per se unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
243. Young, 427 U.S. at 52. To be classified as an adult theater, the theater must display
films which show “[h]uman genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal; . . . acts of human
masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy; . . . fondling or other erotic touching,” or a display of
certain delineated anatomic parts. Id. at 53 & n.4 (citation omitted in original).
244. Id. at 52.
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amended a ten-year-old “Anti-Skid Row Ordinance,” were enacted to combat
the burgeoning influx of crime and unwanted “transients” that can occur in
areas where SOBs are located in close proximity to each other.245 Further,
Detroit argued that this co-location caused increased crime, particularly
prostitution, and increased urban flight by both residents and businesses.246
Two operators of adult theaters brought an action challenging the new zoning
ordinances on Equal Protection and First Amendment grounds.247
In this case of first impression analyzing the interaction between zoning and
free speech, the Court began its analysis by noting that all theaters, not merely
adult theaters, must satisfy some locational and licensing requirements to
receive zoning approval in Detroit.248 Further, the Court stated that separation
requirements did not offend First Amendment principles,249 classifying this
requirement as a proper time, place, or manner regulation in furtherance of
“significant governmental interests.”250 The Court emphasized that in other
instances, like commercial speech or distribution of non-obscene pornography
to minors, which do not require a secondary-effects analysis to be restricted,

In addition to adult motion picture theaters and “mini” theaters . . . the regulated
uses include adult bookstores; cabarets (group “D”); establishments for the sale of beer
or intoxicating liquor for consumption on the premises; hotels or motels; pawnshops;
pool or billiard halls; public lodging houses; secondhand stores; shoeshine parlors; and
taxi dance halls.
Id. at 52 n.3.
245. Id. at 54–55.
246. Id. at 55.
247. Id. at 50; see also U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. The adult-theater operators also
challenged on due process vagueness grounds, but that argument was summarily rejected by the
Court because even if the ordinance was vague as asserted, neither plaintiff had standing to
challenge the possibly vague language. Young, 427 U.S. at 58–59.
248. Young, 427 U.S. at 62 (noting that zoning and licensing restrictions do not trigger
automatic invalidation of ordinances on First Amendment grounds).
249. Although 500 and 1000 foot separations were the methods chosen by the local
government in Young, id. at 52, other avenues of regulation exist. The local government in
Renton chose to cluster SOBs in one section of the city, leaving a majority of the city off-limits to
these business owners. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 44–45 (1986).
The distance and locational requirements weigh less in determining whether to approve a
regulation than does the underlying purpose of the exclusionary zones. See New Albany DVD,
L.L.C. v. City of New Albany, 581 F.3d 556, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a 1000-foot
buffer is not a dispositive issue as the requirement that a regulation be tailored to serve a
significant purpose does not require the most narrowly tailored restriction possible).
250. Young, 427 U.S. at 63 & n.18. A time, place, or manner restriction is a content-neutral
regulation that restricts the location of a speech-related activity. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 223, at §16.47, at 1320. To determine the legitimacy of an alleged time, place, or manner
regulation, courts use a three-part test analyzing whether the restriction is “content-neutral,
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave[s] open ample alternative
channels of communication.” Id.
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the government can create a content-based regulation without running afoul of
the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause.251
The Court gave great deference to the city’s assertion that the preservation
of “the character of its neighborhoods” was enough justification for this
ordinance and that its factual findings were adequate to demonstrate that the
desired effect would be achieved through this regulation.252 Further, the Court
stated that, because the only thing “at stake [was] nothing more than a
limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited . . . the city’s
interest in the present and future character of its neighborhoods adequately
support[ed]” its separation requirements for sexually oriented businesses.253
Thus, the secondary-effects doctrine—a new doctrine with which to judge
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech—was formulated.254
The secondary-effects doctrine legitimizes the regulation of non-obscene
sexually oriented material by focusing, not on the suppression of speech, but
on the effects that an SOB may have on the surrounding area.255 The
particularized effects experienced in each locality are less important to courts
than the local government’s assertion that possible effects exist other than the
mere promotion of sexually oriented material.256 Some secondary effects
accepted by courts include the reduction of crime, the prevention of decreased
property values, and the preservation of the “quality of the city’s
neighborhoods.”257 However, the secondary effect most cited as justification
251. Young, 427 U.S. at 68–70 (“Such a line may be drawn on the basis of content without
violating the government’s paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected
communication.”). The Court was explicit that total suppression would violate the First
Amendment, but “the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for
placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.” Id. at 70–71.
252. Id. at 71 (“[T]he city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with
solutions to admittedly serious problems.”).
253. Id. at 71–72. “Detroit has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship, and has
imposed no limitation on those who wish to view them.” Id. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring).
254. See id. at 71 n.34.
255. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 583 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
256. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
257. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (citing City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1986)). A number of influential studies are
referenced when analyzing the secondary impacts of SOBs. See, e.g., Indianapolis Dep’t of
Metro. Dev., Div. of Planning, Adult Entertainment Businesses in Indianapolis: An Analysis i–iv
(1984), available at http://secondaryeffectsresearch.com/files/Indianapolis,%2084.pdf (discussing
a study of the effects of adult entertainment businesses in Indianapolis). The Indianapolis study
found a direct correlation between crime and the character of a residential neighborhood and
discovered that areas with operating adult-entertainment businesses saw a fifty-six percent
increase in crime. Id. at ii. More specifically, sex-related crimes occurred four times more
frequently in those neighborhoods. Id. Furthermore, although the state’s overall housing-market
was decreasing with regard to the number of houses being placed on the market, the opposite was
true in neighborhoods with adult-entertainment businesses where houses were being placed on the
market at prices substantially lower than expected. Id. at ii–iii. Eighty percent of real-estate
appraisers reported that even one adult business would depreciate the value of surrounding

2011]

Regulating Morality

437

for certain regulations is the projected introduction or expansion of crime in a
certain locality.258 Therefore, the government’s assertion in Young that it was
attempting to curb the secondary effects of increased crime, decreased property
values, and increased population flight, was sufficient justification to the
incidental imposition on sexually oriented business owners’ First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.259
2. Is the Secondary-Effects Doctrine Truly Content-Neutral?
Although most government-imposed restrictions on speech require an
analysis under the strict scrutiny test,260 a content-neutral regulation is
governed by a lesser standard.261 Content neutrality requires regulation
“without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”262 Further,
regulations must be reviewed to see if government “disagreement with the
message” was the underlying reason for enactment.263 Some interference with
speech is allowed under content-neutral regulations if that interference is
“incidental” and the purpose is “unrelated to the content of [the]
expression.”264
Critical analysis demonstrates that zoning ordinances targeting SOBs cannot
qualify as content-neutral.265 Although these ordinances are upheld under a
time, place, and manner test if they only limit the locations of businesses and
do not limit the amount of speech allowed,266 it must be recognized that they
property, and fifty percent of these appraisers opined that the depreciation is often over ten
percent. Id. For an in-depth analysis of these major studies, see Peter R. Hecht, Report To: The
American Center for Law and Justice on the Secondary Impacts of Sex Oriented Businesses
(1996), http://secondaryeffectsresearch.com/files/ACLJ,%2096.pdf.
258. See, e.g., Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 436 (discussing a 1977 study that
documented increased crime rates in areas populated with sexually oriented businesses); Barnes,
501 U.S. at 584 (Souter, J., concurring) (acknowledging significant government interest in
“preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes”); Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (noting
significant government interest in preventing crime).
259. Young, 427 U.S. at 71–73.
260. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 223, § 16.1, at 1131–32. Strict scrutiny requires the
government to prove that a restriction on speech “is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.”
Id. § 16.1, at 1131.
261. Id. § 16.1, at 1131–33.
262. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
263. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
295 (1984)). “The government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.” Id.
264. Id.
265. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–71 (1976). The Court in Young
clearly endorsed the use of content as a dividing line for zoning regulations provided the
regulation did not completely stifle the protected form of expression. Id. Therefore, these are
content-based regulations. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 223, § 16.1, at 1131–32
(discussing and providing examples of content-based regulations).
266. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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are a judicially created exception to content-based strict scrutiny267 and not
truly content-neutral. The ordinances in Young specifically and overtly
regulated one type of speech and expression, that which is sexually oriented,
and therefore this cannot be called content-neutral.268 The Court should
acknowledge this anomaly and state that this is one more exception to the strict
scrutiny test, which was designed to benefit communities and allow them to
exercise their police powers.269 No such acknowledgment has been made,
however, and courts have varied views when addressing sexually oriented
zoning regulations, calling some content-neutral, some content-based, and
some viewpoint-neutral, though they apply the secondary-effects doctrine to
the zoning issues generally.270
3. From Young to Alameda
Although Justice Lewis F. Powell’s Young concurrence suggested adopting
the four-part test of United States v. O’Brien,271 the majority chose to articulate
a slightly different, but related, test as it continued to wrestle with the zoning
of SOBs.272 In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court announced
a three-part test to analyze zoning ordinances with respect to sexually oriented
businesses.273 Under this test, three questions must be addressed: (1) whether
267. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 800 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“Except in instances involving well-settled categories of
proscribable speech, strict scrutiny is the baseline rule for reviewing any content-based
discrimination against speech.” (internal citation omitted)). A strict scrutiny analysis requires the
Government to prove that the regulation “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464
(2007).
268. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
269. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992).
From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized societies,
has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are
“of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”
Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
270. See, e.g., Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (discussing a content-based statute under a contentneutral analysis); PMG Int’l. Div., L.L.C. v. Rumsfeld, 303 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding that a law restricting the sale of sexually explicit magazines in military exchanges was
“reasonable and viewpoint neutral”).
271. Young, 427 U.S. at 79–80. The Court observed that
[u]nder [the O’Brien] test, a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified, despite its
incidental impact upon First Amendment interests, “if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on . . . First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”
Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
272. See infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text.
273. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986).
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the ordinance is a time, place, and manner regulation; (2) whether the
regulation is content-neutral or content-based;274 and (3) if it is content-neutral,
whether the “time, place, and manner regulations . . . serve a substantial
governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication.”275
In applying this test to the facts in Renton, the Court paralleled many of its
findings in Young.276 The Renton Court, in its discussion of the first prong,
held that because the ordinance “[did] not ban adult theaters altogether,” it was
“properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.”277 In
turning to the second prong, which concerns the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral ordinances, the Court looked first to the
underlying motivation for the regulation.278 The Court accepted the district
court’s finding that “the City Council’s ‘predominate concerns’ were with the
secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the content of adult films
themselves.”279 Consequently, after accepting the district court finding
regarding the city council’s intent, the Court found the regulation to be
content-neutral and not violative of First Amendment principles.280 Quoting
the deferential standard set forth in Young,281 the Renton Court went one step
further in its analysis of the third prong.282 The Court rejected the finding of
the Ninth Circuit—that each city must perform individualized research prior to
enacting secondary-effect zoning ordinances—and held that reliance on the
studies and experiences of a similarly situated city was sufficient to support the
city’s assertion that its underlying goal in enacting the ordinance was to
prevent deleterious secondary effects.283 In looking at the limit to alternative
274. The Court must find an ordinance to be content-neutral in order to continue with the test
because the “Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on
the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.” Id.
275. Id. at 47. The final portion references an intermediate level of scrutiny, as opposed to
the strict scrutiny normally required for First Amendment issues. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 223, § 16.1, at 1133.
276. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 46.
277. Id. (“The Renton ordinance, like the one in [Young v.] American Mini
Theatres . . . merely provides that such theaters may not be located within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.”).
278. Id. at 47.
279. Id. (internal citation omitted). Specifically, the Court found that “[t]he ordinance by its
terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and
generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts,
and the quality of urban life.’” Id. at 48 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (internal
citation omitted).
280. Id. at 48.
281. Id. at 50 (“[A] city’s ‘interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one
that must be accorded high respect.’” (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71
(1976))).
282. Id. at 50–52.
283. Id. at 50–51.
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means of communication, the Court noted that both lower courts found that the
520-acre set-aside for adult theaters was “[a]mple, accessible real
estate, . . . criss-crossed by freeways, highways, and roads.”284 At bottom, the
Court determined that Renton’s ordinance regulating sexually oriented
businesses was valid and not violative of any constitutional rights.285
Although the case did not involve the zoning of a sexually oriented business,
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.286 had the last significant effect on the Renton test
prior to the Court’s consideration of City of Los Angeles v. Alameda.287 In
Pap’s A.M., the city had enacted a generalized ordinance that banned nudity in
all public locations.288 The Court stated that “[b]eing ‘in a state of nudity’
[was] not an inherently expressive condition.”289 Following that logic, the
regulation was determined to be content-neutral and not subject to a strict
scrutiny test for suppression of speech.290 The Pap’s A.M. Court cited to
Renton, but applied the O’Brien test, the four-prong precursor to Renton’s
three-prong test, and found the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city’s
powers.291
More significant than the final conclusion, however, was the support local
governments received for their decisions to fight secondary effects. The Pap’s
A.M. Court found that cities could rely on, not only studies conducted by
similarly situated cities, such as the city in Renton, but also on judicial

We think the Court of Appeals imposed on the city an unnecessarily rigid burden of
proof. The record in this case reveals that Renton relied heavily on the experience of,
and studies produced by, the city of Seattle. In Seattle, as in Renton, the adult theater
zoning ordinance was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the presence
of even one such theater in a given neighborhood.
Id. When discussing secondary effects as a motivator, the Supreme Court “has considered both
quantitative and intangible secondary effects in establishing an important government interest.”
Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint Neutral Zoning of Adult Entertainment Businesses, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 470 (2004). Intangible effects include “deterioration or urban life
and city neighborhoods, decrease in quality and character of community life, and degradation of
order and public morality.” Id. at 469–70. Quantifiable effects include crime increases, traffic
changes, and noise increases. Id. at 470.
284. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brief
for Appellants app. at 28a, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (No. 841360)).
285. Id. at 54–55 (“In sum, we find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid
governmental response to the ‘admittedly serious problems’ created by adult theaters.” (quoting
Young, 427 U.S. at 71)).
286. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
287. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
288. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 283.
289. Id. at 289.
290. Id. at 290–92.
291. Id. at 295–97, 301–02.
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conclusions from other secondary-effects cases.292 Combining the broad
deference given to local governments in the exercise of their police powers
through zoning with the ability to rely on previous judicial conclusions
regarding possible secondary effects appears to give any carefully crafted
legislation wide latitude to locate SOBs within a particular jurisdiction.
4. The Secondary-Effects Doctrine in Action: Evidentiary Issues in Lower
Courts
Although it appears that the Supreme Court has, in its evolution of the
secondary-effects doctrine, reduced the required showing of a local
government to uphold an ordinance, lower courts are not following
lock-step.293 When there is doubt regarding the government’s intentions for
enacting an ordinance, it is required to rebut that doubt with an evidentiary
showing of the secondary effects it intended to inhibit by imposing the
ordinance.294 This evidentiary burden is minimal; the government need only
produce evidence that “fairly supports” the asserted secondary effect rationale
for the regulation.295 However, even in light of this low evidentiary burden,
the government cannot assert a post facto secondary-effect rationale for a
regulation that was initially intended to restrict the distribution of sexually
oriented material.296 Although the Supreme Court has allowed municipalities
to rely on studies regarding the secondary effects on neighboring jurisdictions,
lower courts appear to give less deference to these ordinances and require a
local government to meet the already low standard of “fairly supports.”297

292. Id. at 296–97 (“Because the nude dancing of Kandyland is of the same character as the
adult entertainment at issue in Renton[ and] Young, . . . it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that
such nude dancing was likely to produce the same secondary effects.”).
293. See, e.g., New Albany DVD, L.L.C. v. City of New Albany, 581 F.3d 556, 559–60 (7th
Cir. 2009) (holding that reliance on other cities’ studies was not sufficient because those cities
relied on data for live shows, though the business in question was selling only take-home
materials).
294. Id. at 560.
295. Id. (citing City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438–39 (2002)).
296. See White River Amusement Pub, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 481 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir.
2007) (noting that the “Renton standard suggests that pre-enactment evidence [of secondary
effects] is necessary” and that a city must have evidence such that it reasonably believed before
enacting the regulation that it would be relevant to the issue sought to be addressed); McCrothers
Corp. v. City of Mandan, 728 N.W.2d 124, 134 (N.D. 2007) (concluding a city ordinance was
valid because the court was “satisfied that the predominating factor in enacting the zoning
ordinances was the negative secondary effects of the adult establishments . . . , rather than an
intention to restrict the First Amendment rights of [the ordinance’s challengers]”).
297. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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V. APPLYING THE SECONDARY-EFFECTS DOCTRINE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
OTHER LAND-USE CONTROLS
So long as the genetic code continues to author and, thereby, create an
ineradicable human sexual drive,298 and modern society creates an atmosphere
of intrigue, fantasy, and titillation with human sexuality,299 obscenity and
pornography will have a ready market for entrepreneurialism.300 Indeed, the
businesses that pander to and prey upon sexual interests and salacious
curiosities will continue to reach every segment of society and every point of
geography,301 both physical and electronic.302
The extent to which a free society seeks to regulate sexual expression is
problematic.303 What was defined as immoral or “contra bonos mores”304 in
the twentieth century has become less of an issue in today’s liberal society.305
Freedom of sexual intimacy and expression are rights protected by the First

298. See SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 47–48 (James Strachey,
trans., 2d ed. 1961) (“From the very first we recognized the presence of a sadistic component in
the sexual instinct.”); POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1 (“From the genes, and perhaps
from early childhood development as well, we obtain out basic sexual drive and preferences.”).
299. LANE, supra note 95, at 289; see also Gopnik, supra note 220, at E1 (discussing nudity
and sexual themes in art).
300. See LANE, supra note 95, at xvi–xxi (discussing, in part, the presence and prevalence of
pornography); see also DINES, supra note 96, at 47, 52 (marveling at the “staggering” size of the
pornography industry). The “pornographization” of American culture has been advanced
significantly by television, such as the series Sex and the City where “porn-type sex is a fixture on
the show,” and in the print media by publications such as Cosmopolitan Magazine, which has,
over the years, featured pedestrian suggestions for non-traditional levels of sexual gratification.
DINES, supra note 96, at xxx, 105–07.
301. Zoning laws in rural communities are not capable of coping with the flux of sexually
oriented businesses because “most small towns and counties do little more than segregate
property into zones for residences, farms and businesses.” Howlett, supra note 155, at 3A. Thus,
“freeway porn” has invaded smaller communities, settling in non-exclusionary zones. Id.
302. See GERARD, supra note 235, § 1.02, at 2–4 (discussing the increased attention given to
regulating adult entertainment and businesses throughout the decades); KELLY & COOPER, supra
note 171, at 15–22 (discussing the increasing prevalence of sex in the media and entertainment
throughout the twentieth century).
303. See generally Cole, supra note 29 (discussing the issues faced throughout the years
when trying to regulate sexual expression).
304. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
305. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 578–79 (2003) (overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986) and protecting the right of homosexual persons to
engage in private, consensual, sexual activity); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973)
(protecting a woman’s right to choose); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1966)
(protecting the right to use contraception as a marital privacy right). In his dissent in Lawrence,
Justice Antonin Scalia opined that the majority chose to disregard moral judgments as sufficient
grounds for “criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and
obscenity” and thus “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and Fourteenth Amendments.306 But, with every assertion of a fundamental
right or liberty must come a concomitant understanding that there is a
coordinate responsibility to exercise that right reasonably. Determining the
reasonableness of conduct grounded in these two amendments must be
fact-sensitive and guided by community standards.307 Broad, open-ended
moral judgments should be eschewed as foundational bases for legal
judgments.308 Indeed, advancing moral grounds as a justification for
regulating personal liberties of sexual expression and association is an invalid
means of enacting exclusionary land-use regulations, such as the containment
of activities connected with SOBs.309
Given contemporary society’s cultural decline and the acceptance of private
standards of moral conduct as more relevant than an amorphous ideal of public
morality that safeguards the common good,310 the wiser path for enforcement
and regulations of SOBs would be for the state and its municipalities to use
their police powers to regulate public health,311 rather than enforce a standard
of public morality. Put simply, threats to public health from the types of
promiscuous, random, unsafe sexual conduct that may often occur at SOBs can
be better documented by use of the secondary-effects doctrine during the initial
licensing phase of the SOB as opposed to attempting to find and prove issues
of moral misconduct.
Formulating a bright-line rule to assess when questionable conduct or
pornographic material rises to the level of obscenity, and thus should be strictly
censured or regulated, is nearly impossible.312 In trying to either eliminate or
contain the operation of SOBs, the most logical and common-sense approach is
for legislators, land-use planners, zoning commissioners, and courts to rely
upon and use several tools: exclusionary-zoning techniques and common law
nuisance fortified by either moral, anticipatory, or aesthetic iterations or

306. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79; see also Koppelman, supra note 121, at 908 n.55
(describing the Supreme Court’s protection of sexual expression under the First Amendment).
307. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1650 (discussing moral codes as being
community-specific).
308. Id. at 1639.
309. WING ET AL., supra note 170.
310. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 1–4 (1996).
311. See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 99, 113–14 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., 2d ed.
2010).
312. George P. Smith II, Nudity, Obscenity and Pornography: The Streetcars Named Lust
and Desire, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 155, 189 (1988) [hereinafter Smith, Nudity,
Obscenity and Pornography]. The level at which pornography becomes hard-core and obscene,
and “utterly without redeeming social importance” is as elusive today as it was in 1964 in
Jacobellis v. Ohio. 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)). In a concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart opined that, although he could not define,
intelligibly, when pornography became hard core and thus obscene, he nevertheless “kn[e]w it
when [he] s[aw] it.” Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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models.313 Although it is difficult to determine when, under nuisance law,
conduct is so unreasonable as to warrant its cessation, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts314 provides a workable construct for making that
determination. Both strengthened and guided by the doctrine of secondary
effects, nuisance actions of all types serve as an additional tool in the arsenal of
legal weapons that may be used to regulate effectively SOBs.
Through either dispersal or concentration of SOBs, the practical effect of
these models of exclusionary zoning is simply to push their location to other
areas within a community or its neighboring regions.315 When strict licensing
standards for initial start-up business operations are introduced as part of a
land-use policy for regulating SOBs, however, a stronger, balanced response is
achieved.316
CONCLUSION
The implementation of a community-based standard of morality for proper
regulatory control of SOBs will always present an issue of unpredictability
inherent in its underlying flexibility.317 For the content-neutral regulation of
sexually oriented businesses, the only limiting requirement analyzed, aside
from ensuring adequate alternative channels of communication, is whether the
regulation serves a significant government interest.318 Further, although the
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that preventing a multitude of secondary
effects is a significant government interest, the manner in which that goal
could be served has not been meaningfully defined or limited.
The secondary-effects doctrine places great power, and corresponding
responsibility, in the hands of each local community, but it does so at the peril
of uniformity. Although uniformity is not an absolute necessity in the
federalist system, the type and severity of secondary effects that may serve as a
justification for regulating the location of a sexually oriented business should
be clarified. The time, place, or manner restrictions imposed can be left up to
each locality to tailor to their needs, but the triggering events for those
restrictions must be defined more clearly.
313. Daniel J. McDonald, Regulating Sexually Oriented Businesses: The Regulatory
Uncertainties of a “Regime of Prohibition by Indirection” and the Obscenity Doctrine’s
Communal Solution, 1997 BYU L. REV. 339, 341–42 (1997).
314. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827, 828 (1979).
315. See GARNETT, supra note 113, at 1103, 1108.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 188–91.
317. See Smith, Nudity, Obscenity and Pornography, supra note 312, at 187–89 (discussing
the inability to concretely define moral perceptions, specifically with regard to obscenity); see
also Pettys, supra note 76, at 1215 (observing that “perpetual moral conflict is simply inevitable”
because the lines between normative standards for public and private morality are largely
ephemeral in today’s society and, thus, subject to conflict at judicial, legislative, and regulatory
levels of government).
318. See supra text accompanying note 249.

